Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your involvement. We are glad

you stay involved, engaged in this. I think the good news I have

heard you say already—and I apologize for missing your opening

statement—is that we have got to stay engaged in this, in this

process, that we cannot sit on the sidelines and hope somehow it

resolves itself.

I happen to believe there are some opportunities in all of this as

well, to strengthen some relationships and to take us in some improved

directions with some of the parties involved in the Pacific

Rim. I guess I would like to ask you—you may have addressed this

and I apologize if in your response to earlier questions you may

have touched on some of these. But let me—if you have, you will

tell me so.

But like all of us, I guess here, we are trying to figure out sort

of what is the objective that Kim Jong-Il is seeking with this effort.

What are his goals? Is it—obviously, the ones that come to mind,

it could be deterrence. I question the legitimacy of that, but you

could make a case. Winning economic and political concessions

make a case, I suppose, for that as well.

I suspect—and I am going to ask you to comment on some of

these; there is a question mark on the end of all of this. Prestige

at home and abroad. Where is he vulnerable in his own country?

I suspect it is the only group that may pose some threats to him

would be his own military, so scoring points with them by doing

this may be solidifying his own position at home.

I believe you said at the outset of your comments here or in response

to a question that we are not necessarily interested in regime

change in North Korea; we are interested in a change of behavior.

I think those were your words or words to that effect. If

that is the case—and I would like to have you make the case

here—why are we more explicit? If in fact many argue that what

Kim Jong-Il is seeking here and what the Chinese and the South

Koreans and the Japanese and the Russians cannot really offer is

exactly what you have suggested in your comments here, that the

only thing the United States can offer that others cannot is this not

seeking regime change militarily, I guess you might want to add

here.

Why not be more explicit about that if in fact that may be the

piece that North Korea is seeking? I am making that as a conclusion.

I put a question mark there because I want to know whether

or not you agree with that. Other than that, then go back to my

earlier point and what are the objectives? What are they trying to

achieve here? I am sort of mystified by what goals they hope to accomplish

with all of this.

Have we said that to them directly?

But we are not going to let them—you say we are

not going to let them acquire weapons. Do they not already have

them?

Could it be enough to maybe do six or eight? I

have heard the report they have enough material to produce six or

eight.

I do not want to—the reason I say do they not

already have it is because we heard from John Negroponte testifying

publicly that he believes in fact they do have this, they do

have this capacity.

Weapons, nuclear weapons capability.

But they are getting—if not there, it is your view

that they are pretty close to doing that?

Let me if I can—let me ask you quickly about the

Chinese, because here there have been some who have suggested

that the Chinese ought to listen to us, that this could be a defining

moment in the relationship with China. I understand that. Are we

listening to the Chinese? It seems to me here, of all the players

outside of ourselves, the critical country regarding this effort here

is China, for all the obvious reasons, I think some of which you

have articulated already.

It seems to me that we ought to be listening to the Chinese because

they may have the key to this issue, and I wonder if you

might expound on that a bit.

But they are being cooperative?

They are being very cooperative in your view?

Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question?

Just one more. I realize we are holding things up,

but I gather you—well, I will not put words in your mouth, but you

seem less than optimistic about the possibility of some sort of an

arrangement or deal here with North Korea, with all of us trying

to wrestle with what their intentions are, what their goals are. I

wonder if you might just go back to thinking about the Agreed

Framework, where for 8 years anyway the plutonium program was

frozen in North Korea. Now, there was obviously the problem in

2002 with Assistant Secretary Kelly. We discovered the enriched

uranium program that they had, they argued was not part of the

Agreed Framework, we obviously argued it was, and so things

broke down.

But what is the problem with going back and trying to recreate

the conditions in 1994 that produced the Agreed Framework? And

is there not a possibility there that there is a deal? If there was

something that produced that kind of deal, albeit not perfect and

there were problems, clearly problems in 2000–2001, there were

certainly some advantages North Korea saw in 1994 that caused

them to freeze the plutonium program, which was clearly in our interest

and the interest of those who want to see a disarmed North

Korea.

Put aside the freeze for a second. What are the

conditions that produced that agreement? You can change the——

We never provided them, really, did we?

In your view could that have been a problem and

why this thing might have failed, because the light water reactors

were never forthcoming?